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'The way in which white has governed black in South Africa during approximately the past
century', formed the focus of Edgar Brookes's History of Native Policy published in 1924.'
Over the years, colonialism, segregation and apartheid have served as alternative labels for
'native policy', purported answers to the question 'What is the appropriate manner in which
to govern Africans?' Responses to this question, and the particular role of customary law,
form the subject of this paper, and its argument that by the end of the nineteenth century, the
ground had been laid, in the Cape and Natal, for the recognition of African forms of
government, including customary law, a development which may be located in the
philosophies of indirect rule and liberalism. Africans were to be governed by 'traditional'
structures, while the imperatives of progress were heeded by providing for the development
of individuals.
The nineteenth century and Cape liberalism revisited
There is no need to recount the familiar narrative of South African historiography - and
succumb to an unwitting teleology - in order to note that the race and capital war appears to
be over.2 Combatants have shed their uniforms along with monocausal explanations, forcing
South African historians to range broadly in explaining the modern racial order, avoiding
culture and eschewing economy. Factors to be considered, according to Beinart and Dubow,
'include the impact of modernity, the influence of social Darwinism and the metaphors,
symbols and everyday assumptions that help to sustain notions of racial difference and
political entitlement.'3 Paul Rich does his bit by rejecting the 'blueprint' thesis, while Vivian
Bickford-Smith insists upon the 'situational' study of the development of racial policies.4
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In this rapidly expanding universe ofhistorical causes there remains a common understanding
about the colonial state's approach to Africans in the nineteenth century, one rooted in the
'liberal decline'. 'The missionary cause,' writes Keegan, 'originally so convinced of the
malleability of the human material at its disposal, and of Africans' receptivity to the cultural
norms of the mission, became quite quickly suffused with notions of the innate inferiority of
Africans once the initial flush of humanitarian enthusiasm had worn off.'5 This progression
is located within the Cape Colony, the Boer Republics having had no such pretensions to
begin with, and Natal following Shepstone's lead away from such philosophies, under strict
instructions from the Treasury.6
When exactly the shift began and how it progressed, are somewhat unclear, the milestones
faded. What is certain is that by the third decade of the twentieth century, in Keegan's words,
'the wheel had turned.'7 Literate Africans were abandoned by a perfidious state which
'understood better than any other colonial power the need for a policy that would harness
culturally legitimate political allies - and not literate Africans ambivalent or even hostile to
tradition.'8 Thus the state had committed itself to its course, one which, with minor
variations would lead to apartheid, bantu authorities and bantustans, untrammelled by internal
white opposition, notably 'Cape liberalism'.
Late lamented liberalism has been exhumed from its neatly tended grave by Clifton Crais's
The Making of the Colonial Order, which, despite its failings, has caused a re-evaluation of
an important period of Cape history. While not deviating from the liberal decline argument,
Crais draws attention to the existence of alternative forms of power in the nineteenth century.
Applying Foucault, he contrasts 'two fundamentally antithetical forms of colonial power':
that of the VOC, where 'power radiated from the body of the white master', or power as
property; and that of the British, which 'rested on the accumulation of knowledge on and
about the dominated and the production of truth in the exercise of more diffuse but
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potentially more invidious forms of control.'9
What is most novel about Crais's account is not so much its trendiness as the argument that
the first half of the nineteenth-century was decisive in shaping the South African racial
order.10 This contribution to eastern Cape history proved so unsettling as to merit a special
review section in the pages of the South African Historical Journal, wherein Jeff Peires,
warnings about the postmodern gevaar aside, argued that Crais failed to give adequate
attention to Cape liberalism. 'And yet,' Peires concluded, 'if the first half of the nineteenth
century in the Eastern Cape did produce a common structure of thought, it was that elusive,
ambiguous, rickety and hypocritical structure known as Cape liberalism.'"
And yet, Crais's treatment of liberalism is precisely what attracted Martin Legassick's
attention in the course of a rambling review. 'For him,' Legassick writes of Crais, 'the
transition to settler capitalism was not so much rooted in the "failure" of liberalism but in the
"Janus face" of liberalism itself. The racial forms of domination of the nineteenth-century
Cape were not the antithesis of liberalism, but grew out of one part of its contradictory
discourse.'12 It is fitting that Legassick should draw attention to this development as he was
responsible for a series of papers - almost three decades ago, almost all unpublished - on the
nature of South African liberalism,13 His insights into the power of liberal thought remain
unsurpassed, the directions he mapped out unexplored, swallowed in the vortex of the
'liberal-radical debate'.
Tim Keegan is another who has recently confessed his attraction to the liberal enigma,
11
 Clifton Crais, The making of the colonial order. While supremacy and black resistance in the Eastern Cape,
1770-1865 (Johannesburg 1992), p. 87.
10
 Martin Legassick. 'The state, racism and the rise of capitalism in the nineteenth-century Cape Colony' (28
South African Historical Journal 1993), p. 330.
11
 J. B. Peires, 'Pinning the tail on the donkey,' (28 SAW 1993), p. 321.
'• Legassick, 'The state, racism and the rise of capitalism', p. 336. Legassick draws attention to a paper by
Crais which considers liberalism, and the failings of South African history, in greater detail - Clifton C. Crais.
'Race, the state, and ihe silence of history in the making nf modern South Africa. Preliminary departures' (Africa
seminar, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 22 July 1992).
13
 Legassick, 'Liberalism, social control and liberation in South Africa' (paper presented to UK Political Science
Association Conference, 1974); The making of South African "native policy", 1903-1923: the origins of
'segregation'" (University of London, ICS Postgraduate seminar, 15 Feb. 1973); 'The rise of modem South African
liberalism: its assumptions and its social base' (University of London, ICS Postgraduate seminar, 1 March 1973);
'British hegemony and the origins of segregation in South Africa, 1901-14' in Beinart and Dubow (eds), Segregation
and apartheid in twentieth-century South Africa [1972-73].
awarding Legassick the 'seminal' rosette for his review of Crais.14 For Keegan liberal
ambiguity is encapsulated in its simultaneous adoption of the principles of assimilation and
territorial segregation, ambiguities 'accompanied by cultural absolutism.'15
While the nature of liberalism is re-examined, its strength is not, which is why Leon de
Kock's Civilising Barbarians, straddling history and literary criticism, covers new ground in
considering the importance of literacy and the civilising mission in the making of colonial
South Africa. Missionary discourse, for De Kock, was a powerful element of Cape
liberalism. At institutions such as Lovedale it 'not only established a widespread literate
order incorporating institutional surveillance, but... in doing this it sought to "translate"
African subjectivity into excessively narrow limits of expression determined by Western
literary forms of understanding.'16 Africans' success in appropriating the discourse of
civilisation as a weapon against colonialism, should not detract from the ways in which their
subjectivities were shaped, and to some extent controlled.
Cape historiography in the 1990s has opened the way for a re-examination of liberalism and
government a century ago by raising the ambiguity that liberalism is both more and less than
it appears - less accommodating, more powerful.
Foucault ("Theory ahead)
The mere mention of theory causes most historians to scurry into the nearest archive, pausing
only to fling disparaging remarks about French intellectuals, a suspicion translated into print
when they have engaged with the opponents of their trade, doing so fiercely, leaving little
room for compromise. It is hardly surprising that Foucault, and indeed French theorists in
general, tend to receive scant attention, much of it negative. Given that Foucault has been
criticised for his periodisation of European history, can there be any value in exporting his
ideas to an African context? Before considering some of the work which has done just this,
we must begin with some of Foucault's ideas.
If one word is required to describe Foucault's primary concern, it is 'power'. Dissatisfied
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with the study of power in modern societies, Foucault pronounced, 'We still have not cut off
the head of the king.'17 In pre-modern societies, he argued, power was exercised in a general
form, namely 'the law of transgression and punishment, with its interplay of licit and illicit'
which was 'power in a juridical form'. Thus, 'In Western societies since the Middle Ages,
the exercise of power has always been formulated in terms of law.'18 'Power is not a
substance. Neither it is a mysterious property whose origin must be delved into. Power is
only a certain type of relation between individuals.'19
This form of exercising power, designated sovereignty, is followed by a new form, viz.
surveillance and discipline, which produced 'subjected and practised bodies, "docile"
bodies.'20 Institutions such as prisons, schools, hospitals, factories, armies, all disciplined the
body through a 'micro-physics of power'. 'Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories,
schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?' asked Foucault. Discipline is a
power that '"makes" individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards
individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise.'21
In charting the emergence of disciplinary society, Foucault pointed out the complex and
binding relationship between knowledge and power, expressed in his well-known coupling
pouvoir-savoir, or power-knowledge, or even power/knowledge. The mechanisms of power,
the relationship between power and knowledge and their mutual effect, are at the core of this
concept. Not only does power need knowledge, but in addition 'the exercise of power itself
creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of
information.... The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely,
knowledge constantly induces effects of power.... It is not possible for power to be exercised
without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.'22
Thus Foucault traced the emergence of a new form of power, a micro-physics of power, albeit
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one which bore different labels - including 'surveillance' and 'discipline' - in his work.23
The 'model based on law' was replaced by the 'strategical model', that is 'a multiple and
mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely stable, effects of
domination are produced.'24
This shift was retraced, and developed, by Foucault in his 1978 lectures at the College de
France on the topic of 'govemmentality', defined as follows:
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target
population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means
apparatuses of security.
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-
eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed
government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental
apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex oisavoirs.
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages,
transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes
'governmentalized1.25
Central to govemmentality was the development of liberalism - 'a style of thinking
quintessential^ concerned with the art of governing'.26 Liberalism captured the value of
limited government - made possible by the development of 'society', a complex independent
reality with its own dynamics which could not be violated by the 'police state'27 - and sought
to establish relations between the government and the governed 'in which individuals are
identified as, on the one hand, the object and target of governmental action and, on the other
hand, as in some sense the necessary (involuntary) partner or accomplice of government.)38
Or, as Nikolas Rose explains, 'Persons and activities were to be governed through society,
that is to say, through acting upon them in relation to a social norm, and constituting their
experiences and evaluations in a social form.'29 The aim was 'a government which
economizes on its own costs: a greater effort of technique aimed at accomplishing more
23
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through a lesser exertion of force and authority. )30
But this development does not efface other modes of power. 'Accordingly,' Foucault writes,
'we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a
disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of
government; in reality, one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as
its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security.'31
Although Foucault leaves us with a triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government, he does
not explain how they interact, a difficulty exemplified by his treatment of law. Hunt and
Wickham accuse Foucault of expelling law form modernity through 'his metahistorical thesis
that law constituted the primary form of power in the classical or pre-modern era and his
point that law lingers on in the doctrine of sovereignty which continues to play a significant
ideological role in political discourse. In the real world of power, law has been supplanted by
the disciplines and by government as the key embodiments of power in modern society.'32
Foucault tried to explain how law survived as a mask for power, concealing the procedures of
domination inherent in the techniques of discipline.33 Such ideas on law were emphatically
rejected by E. P. Thompson who asserted that law could function to protect as well as to
oppress.34 Foucault's 'unconvincing reworking of the Marxist conception of the juridical
state as superstructural, with the infrastructure simply refined as mechanisms of disciplinary
coercion' has led Keith Baker to ask, 'Why, after all, do disciplinary regimes need to be
masked by the juridical theory of sovereignty when they possess their own legitimation as
regimes of truth?'35
Reminiscent of quarrels within Marxism, Foucauldian arguments can become scriptural, as
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quotes are used to support opposing propositions in an attempt to establish a true reading. It
is frustrating, indeed futile, to search for a coherent paradigm, neatly explicated by Foucault
himself. In an attempt to chart a way forward, Hunt and Wickham suggest that 'law has been
a primary agent of the advance of new modalities of power' and by conceptualising an
interplay between law, normalisation and discipline, it is possible to inject substance into
Foucault's 'triangle'.36 Unfortunately this interplay disappears in their rigid model, causing
one writer to remark, 'The establishment of a new sub-discipline with methodological
principles is surely a most un-Foucaultian way of using Foucault's work.'37 More helpful is
Hugh Baxter's suggestion that Foucault's
account of the 'network' or 'dense web' of social relations emphasizes the importance of knowledge,
particularly expert knowledge, in the process of constituting, reproducing, contesting, and transforming
relations of power. Foucault's polemical dismissals notwithstanding, law is both product and producer of
this ceaseless process. Law, no less than the discursive practices Foucault analyzed in detail, provides
resources both for the exercise of power and for resistance to power.38
Law is not the same as juridical power. Rather, it exists within different modes of power,
performing different functions. It may be noted that Foucault argued that law, under
discipline, functioned as a 'norm',39 which has led Sheila Duncan to conclude that 'the law
through its disciplinary power is able to normalize as it traces the frontiers of the abnormal,
as it defines, constructs and imposes what is normal.'40
Such statements, implying total subjugation, have led to the charge that Foucauldian theory
makes no allowance for resistance. Such an application of Foucault's ideas do not flow of
necessity from his theory. 'Power is everywhere;' he wrote, 'not because it embraces
everything, but because it comes from everywhere.' Power will always meet resistance, not
in a binary division, but a plurality of resistances. Just as the state 'relies on the institutional
integration of power relations', so revolutions are successful when they achieve a 'strategic
codification of these points of resistance'.41 Elsewhere, Foucault noted, 'individuals are the
vehicles of power, not its points of application.'42 This fits with Baxter's point, above, about
36
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43the possibilities for resistance within law and discursive practices generally.
Foucault and his commentators have postulated a style, or mode, of liberal government, one
which functioned through society, relying increasingly on self-government as subjects
asserted rights and interests 'that should not be interdicted by polities', as well as processes
'that they [government] cannot govern by the exercise of sovereign will because they lack the
requisite knowledge and capacities.'44 Of course, as Pat O'Malley reminds us, this approach
'privileges discourses, with the result that it becomes difficult for it to recognize the
imbrication of resistance and rule, the contradictions and tensions that this melding generates,
and the subterranean practices of government consequently required to stabilise rule.'45
Sometimes governing is made difficult but that most obvious of causes - resistance.
Although the concept of governmentality has been developed to analyse western liberal
states, it offers clues to the nature of their colonial relatives. Governmentality, after all, is
concerned with 'how government is thought into being in programmatic form, how the
practitioners of rule ask themselves the question of how best to govern, what concepts they
invent or deploy to render their subjects governable in certain ways, and how government
constantly reforms itself in light of failures and evaluations', as well as with the techniques
by which these programmes are implemented.46 By employing these ideas our attention is
directed to a particular form of the exercise of power within the young South African state.
The transition from sovereignty, to discipline and government did not occur solely in the
metropole; nor did the periphery simply follow the centre, at a respectful distance. A unique
style of government emerged, influenced by liberalism, homegrown and imported, yet rooted
in traditions of the sovereign exercise of power.
Foucault in Africa: resistance and collaboration
Despite the attractions of Francophilia, few Africanists have attempted to employ Foucault's
work. Those who have, do so to varying degrees. Some, such as Bayart, settle for an
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expression or two sprinkled across the text.47 More useful, perhaps, are those who employ
Foucault, and then distinguish him in an African context. Diana Jeater's work on sexuality in
Southern Rhodesia argues, following Foucault, that the regulation of sexual desire 'provides
one of the most fundamental mechanisms by which power is exerted in a society', but parts
company with the theorist to argue that this process served specific group interests.
Thereafter, Foucault is relegated from the role of theoretical guide to narrator of
developments in sexual discourses in Europe.48
A more comprehensive engagement is provided by Megan Vaughan's work on colonial
medicine. She argues 'that in British colonial Africa, medicine and its associated disciplines
played an important part in constructing "the African" as an object of knowledge, and
elaborated classification systems and practices which have to be seen as intrinsic to the
operation of colonial power.' From this promising start, Foucault's conception of power is
challenged as ruling out effective resistance, and his conception of European medical
discourses and practices is declared inapplicable to Africa.49
For Vaughan there are important differences between the power/knowledge regimes in the
two settings. These relate, in the main, to the greater 'repressive' power employed by 'pre-
modern' colonial states, and the extent to which colonialism, and medical discourse, created
'subjects' as well as 'objects', and operated through individual subjectivities. 'In colonial
medical discourse and practice colonial Africans were conceptualized, first and foremost, as
members of groups (usually but not always defined in ethnic terms) and it was these groups,
rather than individuals, who were said to possess distinctive psychologies and bodies.' This
raises 'the question of how far colonial power operated through the production of
subjectivities at all, and how far it relied on the kind of "repressive" power which Foucault
sees as characterizing pre-modern regimes. Did colonial biomedicine "subjectify" at all, or
did it merely "objectify" through its elaboration of a discourse on "the African"?' It is a
question Vaughan says she cannot fully answer.50 Fred Cooper agrees, adding that 'power in
colonial societies was arterial rather than capillary - concentrated spatially and socially, not
very nourishing beyond such domains, and in need of a pump to push it from moment to
47
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moment and place to place.'51
Unlike Marx it was never Foucault's intent to develop a universal 'paradigm'. In this sense,
Vaughan is correct in highlighting differences between Europe and Africa, and in the
operation of power. Whether this entails a rejection, holus-bolus, of Foucault's conception of
power, is another matter. The nature of the exercise of power changes, in colonial as much as
in metropolitan setting, and part of the answer to Vaughan's question lies in attempting to
track these changes.
Such subtleties have, unfortunately, not detained Crais who applies Foucault with missionary
zeal. Armed with The History of Sexuality, volume I, he castigates South African historians
for 'their collective anaesthetic promenade', their pagan dances to the false god of
liberalism.52 There have been few reports of converts, the attractions of fundamentalism
notwithstanding. As Shula Marks has pointed out, Crais's application of Foucault's ideas are
'perhaps a little too mechanical, a little too pat', lacking evidentiary support.53 Instances of
the shift to discipline are difficult to find to support Crais's claims, and his treatment of the
role of 'law' (usually rendered in quotes) is nonexistent. More may be gained from De
Kock's systematic development of the idea of 'discipline', which examines the way in which
the circulation of knowledge was linked to 'the making of new conceptualisations of
individuality'.54
'Discipline' is not the Foucauldian finale, but one mode of power, coexisting with others, and
capable of appropriation and contestation. By tracing the emergence of different forms of
power, different strategies, not according to a theoretical blueprint but by examination of the
evidence, by proceeding warily, a Foucauldian approach may generate more light than heat.
Custom, law and the Cape
In the Victorian world, law was a benchmark of civilisation, an odometer measuring the
distance covered on the road of progress. Customary law performs the same function for
51
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African societies, whilst reflecting on civilisation itself, raising the uncomfortable question,
how could a primitive legal system be tolerated in a civilised society? Initially rejected as
barbaric, custom came to be recognised as a legal form, and, once recognisable, capable of
appropriation in the service of government.
The status of customary law in the nineteenth-century Cape Colony reflected the uneasy
relationship between the settlers and their African neighbours, a relationship characterised by
the relative weakness of the colonial state. Although the state remained concerned to
'establish Xhosa docility in order to secure the fringes of the colonial order', Alan Lester
points out that for most of the first half of the century it lacked this capacity.55 Successive
schemes attempted to incorporate the Xhosa within the colony, the most notable being that of
Sir George Grey, which according to Keegan, 'required that native peoples abandon not only
their independence and their political systems, but all aspects of their social and cultural lives
that did not accord with the liberals' definition of civilised standards and values, and that they
submit to the tolerant paternalism of white patrons.'56 It was only with the incorporation of
British Kaffraria in 1865 that the African population under direct colonial rule reached
proportions that required a re-examination of government policy.
A Commission of Inquiry under Rev. W. Impey was appointed in January 1865, to inquire
into 'the relations of the Colony with the Native Tribes residing within and upon its borders.'
By the end of April, the Commission had collected evidence but was unable to prepare a
report in time for the then current session of parliament, and only the evidence was submitted
to the governor.37 Although a diversity of opinion was present, the Bishop of Grahamstown
spoke for many when he declared, 'If the natives are to have the advantages of civilised life,
they must be subject to the restraints of civilisation, and the very first of these restraints is as
to the law of marriage.'58 No report was submitted but the evidence of the Reverend Impey
before his own commission was succinct:
There are difficulties on both sides, but upon the whole I would greatly prefer that the natives should be
brought under the ordinary law of the land, and that their own laws should be entirely ignored.... The
natives will have all the benefit of ourjust and righteous laws, and if in any case those laws appear to press
hardly upon them, J think they ought to be prepared to sacrifice something of what they conceive to be
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good, for the greater good that they really obtain by conforming to colonial law.59
It was as clear a statement of cultural superiority as any uttered by a Victorian clergyman.
Law was extolled as a civilising influence beneficial to Africans. Despite the failings of
mission efforts, there was no pessimism as to the possibilities of reform, or optimism as the
acceptance of customary law. Race, the basis of the otherness of Africans, formed no barrier
to incorporation. The violence of assimilation is quite different from the violence of
separation, even if both entail notions of cultural superiority.
The evidence before the Commission was clear, its impact less so. Despite most of the
witnesses' opposition to the Native Succession Act passed the previous year, which had
recognised certain customs and usages relating to inheritance, the law remained in force.60
Religious conviction was one matter; the practicalities of government quite another.
Fifteen years later there followed a similar attempt to garner knowledge and formulate policy,
this time on a far larger scale. In September 1880 Cape Governor Sir Henry Bartle Edward
Frere established a commission to inquire into native laws and customs, suggest a civil and
criminal Code, the possibility of legalising native marriages, the matter of land tenure, and
the advisability of a system of local self-government for native territories. Governor Sir
Hercules Robinson received the commission's report in January 1883.
Although the report contained a draft criminal code which was enacted three years later (Act
24 of 1886), the significance of the 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission is far
greater than the one law it spawned. Under the guidance of the influential judge-pre si dent of
the eastern districts court, Sir Jacob Dirk Barry, the commission shaped thinking on the
subject for the next century, and remains a source of customary law in South Africa.61
Among the witnesses was Sir Theophilus Shepstone, his lengthy interview - he answered
over one thousand questions - permeating the entire report.62 For present purposes, the
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importance of the commission lies less in the legal 'rules' explicated thereby than with the
ideas about African societies, their form of law, and how best to govern them.
The state's interest in customary law lay in fashioning it as an instrument of government. So
the report began with a history of native law, followed by an exposition of its characteristics:
Among them a system of law has for generations past been uniformly recognised and administered.
Although an 'unwritten law,' its principles and practice were widely understood. ... This law took
cognizance of certain crimes and offences; it enforced certain civil rights and obligations .... The system
was to a great extent created by and adapted to the conditions of a primitive, barbaric life, and in some
respects it was not unlike that which prevailed among our Saxon ancestors in the early days of civilization.
But intermixed with it were a number of pernicious and degrading usages and superstitious beliefs, as well
as a course of judicial procedure in cases of the alleged offence of sorcery, or witchcraft, utterly subversive
of justice, and repugnant to the general principles of humanity."
Native law is framed as a recognisable legal system corresponding to primitive European
modes of existence, particularly in its 'rules' which provide for ordered life. Placed on the
evolutionary ladder, native law is granted a limited legitimacy, with the prospect, inevitability
perhaps, of'progress'. A system of law is taken as an embodiment of a people, their
collective will, 'widely understood' and 'treasured', which includes 'pernicious and
degrading usages and superstitious beliefs'.
This paradox had been raised twenty years earlier by Sir Henry Maine who wrote, 'There are
two special dangers to which law, and society which is held together by law, appear to be
liable in their infancy. One of them is that law may be too rapidly developed.' The other was
that which had 'prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The
rigidity of primitive law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with
religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct
which they entertained at the time when their usages were first consolidated into a systematic
form.'64 Although Sir Henry does not feature in the commission documents, his influence
should not be underestimated.
In an acclaimed legal career Maine held the positions of Regius Professor of Civil Law at
Cambridge, Legal Member to the Viceroy's Indian Council, Oxford Professor of
Jurisprudence, Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and, finally, Whewell Professor of
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International Law at Cambridge.65 A specialist in the field of 'primitive law', he published
his most renowned work in 1861. Written in the heyday of Victorian legal science, and
cloaked in the scientific ethos of the day, Ancient Law enjoyed a favourable reception by a
wide audience.66 'With the publication of Ancient Law,' writes Peter Stein, 'legal evolution
had reached its zenith. Mid-Victorians welcomed the doctrine that the law of civilised
societies was the product of a development through a series of identifiable stages related to,
but distinct from, the development of society itself.'67
By the time of the 1883 commission Maine's ideas formed the basis of thought, popular and
learned, on primitive law. His persistent 'sweeping generalisations about races, laws,
peoples, nations' and his assumption that it was possible to measure moral progress, spread
across the English-speaking world.68 In the colonial world, Martin Chanock has argued,
'local worlds have to be described and fashioned in external languages, with external
concepts, derived for different places, societies, and times.'69 And so Maine's language
resonated throughout the world.
In his analysis of the early stages of legal evolution Maine wrote, 'Our authorities leave us no
doubt that the trust lodged with the oligarchy was sometimes abused, but it certainly ought
not to be regarded as a mere usurpation or engine of tyranny.'70 The 1883 commission
agreed:
The inference we may draw from the whole evidence upon the subject is, that although natives have
nothing corresponding to a representative form of government, their existing laws embody the national will,
and that no Chief would attempt to alter a law without taking the opinion of his councillors, or referring the
change to the people.71
African society is subtly de-exoticised, brought within a common evolutionary past, its form
of government distinguished from mere tyranny. This recognition of the validity of modes of
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traditional government created space for the incorporation (or at least tolerance) of African
society without the need for total subjugation.
Just as civilised law was unsuitable for natives, so too with civilised government. In a
striking passage the Commission distinguished between 'Government' and the rule of
African chiefdoms:
Nothing can be more unsatisfactory to his mind than a brief, cold, inanimate telegram or despatch in reply
to all the questions which he has felt it his business to put, and his opportunity of putting which is the one
central point and pivot for his preference of the rule of a Chief. Anything in the nature of an abstract idea
like 'Government' is to him next to if not altogether impossible; and he is apt to be altogether confounded
by the frequent or sudden changes of Party Administration.72
Perhaps Shepstone was the authority for this contention. He had spoken against party
government in native administration, telling the Commission, 'What is, I think, most required
for their satisfactory government is an officer recognised as their head, whose position is
permanent, their confidence in whom could grow, and to whom they could always look for
guidance and advice as well as control.'73 A form of control was thus necessary which
operated not on western principles of Government, but on traditional African ones of
patriarchal rule. So the problem of political incorporation was shelved, with the retention of
tribal structures and, more importantly, government intervention in allegedly traditional
ways. Thus the technique of governing Africans was shaped - not mere repression in the
guise of tradition, but modern ideas which incorporated traditional structures.
It is instructive to compare this position with the classic 'Cape liberal3 argument, as contained
in the dissenting Minority Report by Jonathan Ayliff, MLA. Ayliff argued that it was clear
that 'according to Kafir ideas and practice, effective Government does exist', which meant 'It
would be far preferable to give the Natives to understand that our responsibilities and their
welfare make it unavoidable that all the branches and machinery of Government should be in
our own hands, and... must in all essential points be European.'74
Ayliff s vision of incorporation with no concessions to cultural diversity lacked the
pragmatism of the main report. There was remarkably little support for the principles he
enunciated. Even if, aside from the penal code, little action followed in the wake of the
report, it opened space for the operation of the dual Cape system, which permitted native law
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outside the colony proper. While deploring native customs, the state permitted their
application beyond the realms of civilisation, an explicit recognition of the inability of the
colonial state to govern directly all aspects of social life. Within the colony, in the heartland
of civilisation, this admission was tacit, as African traditions were accorded unofficial
recognition. Government had learnt, however slowly, from its failures and was attempting to
adapt.
There is no better encapsulation of the Cape system as a strategy of governance, than that
provided by Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, a former Cape secretary for native affairs, and acting
premier, to the South African Native Affairs Commission. '[AJs we have had longer
experience than any other South African Colony,' he explained, 'and as our Native is more
civilised - I think he is a better man, too - than the Native in any of the other States, naturally
we are not in such a hurry to alter our system.'
'Would you not think,' a less astute member of the commission asked, 'that the better man he
is and the more political sagacity he has the greater danger he is politically?'
'Of course,' replied Sauer, 'if you follow that out you must get rid of him altogether. To be
logical you must put him in a sack and send him out three miles into neutral waters! We
cannot do that, so we had best made friends with him.'75
And in Natal
In nearby Natal, where the colonial presence was more muted, all native laws, customs and
usages which were not 'repugnant to the general principles of humanity, recognised
throughout the whole civilised world' were preserved by order of the Crown.76 Turning this
principle into a system of law and administration fell to the man who came to embody native
administration, bequeathing his name: Sir Theophilus Shepstone. African chiefs were used as
administrators, becoming the primary agents of government; where none existed, they were
created.77 Native law was preserved as part of the tribal system. 'The main object of keeping
natives under their own law,' Shepstone explained in 1883, 'is to ensure control of them.
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You cannot control savages by civilized law.>78
The strength of Shepstone's system lay in its restricted conception of government, his
unwillingness to legislate against many of the practices found by the missionaries to be
objectionable. He told the 1883 commission he was not prepared to 'legislate for the mere
purpose of making people moral.' However, he continued, 'I hold that, with regard to all
social evils which in their nature involve political mischief, a Government is in duty bound to
act more or less repressively'. And when political mischief arose, it was ruthlessly
suppressed.79
This lack of concern with morality stems, perhaps, from a difficulty with enforcement, or, a
recognition that certain moral principles might undermine the very system which preserved
the order that was crucial to colonial survival. That, after all, was Shepstone's job. Even
securing labour was less important than securing order, which was best done with minimal
interference in African affairs.
Although not without its critics, Shepstone's system found favour in Whitehall for its
economy. The dangers of all needless interference with rooted habits of barbarian races
where not decidedly repugnant to humanity and morals,' declared the Colonial Secretary
Bulwer-Lytton, 'are so great, and conciliation is so wise and easy a method of obtaining
submission and docility from those whom we keep in check by our superior intelligence
rather than our physical force.'80
Shepstone's inability to retain support among both settlers and missionaries made him a
casualty of Natal politics, and rendered him powerless to stop the codification of native law
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in 1878,81 his resistance apparently fuelled by fear of losing his almost unfettered powers.82
Introduced to address the variety of practices by magistrates, codification produced a number
of distortions, but the Code remained in force and was amended in 1891.
Shepstone's brother John, a former secretary for native affairs, provided a succinct statement
of the Natal attitude to chiefs and native law:
You must remember that every hereditary Chief has a very large and powerful influence over his tribe, and
if you make use ol'his services as a subordinate to the Government - and in my opinion every Chief should
have been used in that way up to this moment - then you would have had far more effective government,
and far more power over the Natives than you have now, because if you depose these Chiefs, and simply
leave them in the country, you have instruments for mischief.
[Y]ou require a firm but just government, and a very firm government. They require it; they are savages;
they are uneducated; and I would still make use of their own laws and customs to a great extent, because
they are far more applicable than our own laws would be, than any statutory law that we might frame or
pass, I would not be in any hurry to drag them out of their own system. There is no necessity to do it, and
if you do these things hurriedly, you only do more harm than good.83
A lack of inclination to 'uplift natives' was unsurprising in a colony known for the racism of
its settlers. Henri Guillaume Boshoff, a judge of the native high court, said of the notion of
equality, 'The Native does not seem to recognise the fact that the Great Designer intended
them to be an absolutely distinct section of the community for all their existence.'84 Resident
Magistrate Thomas Bennett told Sanac that bringing Africans under the common law would
be 'suicidal' as 'They would get quite out of hand, and you would have them demanding the
franchise, and demanding all kinds of things.'83
With no recognition of the possibility, or even desirability, of progress, Africans were
relegated to an alien society, perpetual others. Although this resulted in a degree of
autonomy for African communities, it was a sentence of exile for the amakholwa. Johannes
Khumalo, a kholwa chief, had made his preference clear: 'The best thing is for us to be
placed under the rule of His Majesty; let us follow the children of enlightenment, the children
81
 In 1875 the Native Administration Law (Law 26 of 1875) deviated from Shepstonian principles, repealing
Ordinance no. 3 of 1849, establishing a Native High Court, a Court of Appeals and courts of Administrators of
Native Law. Criminal jurisdiction was removed from the chiefs. A process was initiated which three years later
produced the Natal Code of Native Law. See Kahn, Union of South Africa, pp. 322-23.
8
- This view of codification was later expressed by John Chadwick. the secretary to the 1875 Native Law Board:
'reducing the Native customs to writing does away to a great extent with the authority of the Government. They are
bound in a certain way by these Rules and Regulations, and it is not quite so elastic as when the Supreme Chief
could do exactly as he liked.1 Sanac, Volume III, Evidence of J. C. C, Chadwick, s. 28432.
83
 Sanac, Vol. Ill, Evidence of J. Shepstone, ss. 18767 and 18733.
8J
 Ibid., Vol. TIT, Evidence of H.G. Boshoff, s. 23063.
85
 Ibid., Vol. Ill, Evidence of T. R. Bennett, ss. 27215-6.
19
of the sun, who came across from England and gave us peace.'86 But the children of
enlightenment refused to share their place in the sun.
A President approaching the fin-de-siecle
A decade before Sanac, the visions of Natal and the Cape were pitted against the Boer
traditions when the president of the Orange Free State reflected on the issue which had eluded
the best efforts at resolution - the native question.87 President Reitz's solution, in sum, was
to destroy the tribal system and traditions, and 'To adopt the principle and maintain it
steadfastly, that there shall be no "equality" between the aborigines of South Africa and the
people of European descent who have made this land their home.' To those who believed in
equality, the president pointedly remarked, 'if there is to be equality, it should be complete,
and you must not be so unreasonable as to refuse your daughters in marriage to a man who in
every respect but that of colour is your "equal."'88
Reitz's kragdaadigheid was challenged in a number of responses which embodied a positive
yet cautious approach. As one William Hay put it/The problem for South African statesmen
is how to deal with the natives so as to make them of real benefit to the country in which we
all mean to live, if possible, and this requires a policy other than the affirmation of six
negations.'8'' Shepstone himself was scathing of Reitz's naivete - the answer was not to
abolish chiefs, an impossible task, but to 'use them as they have been used during the last 45
years in Natal; use their influence, their system of tribal management, their principle of
mutual responsibility: make room for these in your own system.'90
A remarkable degree of consensus existed on the need to approach African traditions with
caution, not to provoke resistance while not pandering to heathen customs. Even if equality
was impossible, which seemed to be widely accepted, Africans could be transformed into
assets of the countiy in a way which accorded with notions of population and government of
the self. President Reitz and the traditions of the republiek belonged to a passing era. While
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repression did not vanish as a strategy of government, it was losing its appeal as the primary
mode of rule.
The South African Native Affairs Commission (Sanac) 1903-1905
'SANAC is clearly an important landmark in the evolution of the "native policy" of the South
African state... prepared as a guidebook for future reference in the best imperial tradition
through a synthesis of imperial guidelines with local expertise.'91 Expertise on natives which
was accumulated and deployed to facilitate effective government, although to what end is
debatable. Adam Ashforth has argued that Sanac's main purpose was to allow for
segregation, primarily territorial - in a manner acceptable in Britain - which would supply
labour in South Africa, a project to organise native affairs so that natives could be 'induced
without compulsion to become more industrious'.92 There can be no argument with this, as
long as 'industrious' does not relate solely to labour. Breathtaking in its scope, the report
aimed to provide comprehensive knowledge with which to govern Africans, not just as mere
units of labour, but as a population. It is less helpful to say that the state wanted the
population to become more industrious, than to explain how this was to be achieved.
Following in the footsteps of the 1883 commission, Sanac postulated an African form of
government which was based on tribe and chief, heavily patriarchal yet not despotic. 'As the
father is to the family, so is the Chief to the tribe,' the commission reported.93 It was a
favourite analogy of Shepstone's, and confirmed Africans' place in the evolutionary
hierarchy.9"1 As a mode of government it belonged strictly to the European past and the
African present, allowing that the two might coincide while not forcing the issue. After all,
Sanac was aware of the inevitability of progress, of'the process of evolution and the effect of
changes upon people passing from semi-savage life to enlightenment.'95
This was a controversial assumption in a period when many doubted the capacity of Africans
to reach the higher stages of civilisation, and the commission felt compelled to respond to the
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charge that civilisation had wrought more evil than good, reminding its audience, 'The final
outcome of a righteous war is not to be judged by the devastations of opposing armies or by
the scenes of slaughter and bloodshed on the field of battle.'96 As evidence of the progress of
the native, the commission presented scenes of hearth and home to melt the hearts of those
who saw Africans as mere beasts:
In their homes the Natives are a hospitable and social people, clever and bright in repartee, fond of music,
open-hearted and generous hosts, imitative and tractable, and interesting in many ways. They are, speaking
generally, not energetic of disposition, but the struggle for life has not been so hard with them as with the
European nations, and there has in their past history been little to make them continuous workers.97
If the meaningless gyrations of barbarous tribes had failed to stimulate the development of
the African, the influence of civilisation surely would. There could be no doubt of their
common humanity, and human nature was, as everyone knew, susceptible to the flow of
evolution and history which shaped all in their path.
Having brought light to the dark continent, there remained a duty upon the governments of
the South African colonies 'as to the moral and intellectual elevation of the subject race'.98
This was an underlying principle of Sanac's philosophy, a belief in the ability of a superior
civilisation to benefit all humanity. Vices acquired under the influence of such a civilisation
were regrettable but not ineradicable; yet the solution lay not in legal prescription, but in the
inculcation of Christian virtues through moral and religious instruction in all Native schools.
That the commission saw fit to deal with such seemingly mundane matters as the wearing of
clothes indicates the total approach to government. Africans were not to be regulated by law
alone, but disciplined through modern institutions, and, going further, developed into
individuals subject to self-regulation. This was the project of government set forth in the
report of Sanac.
An impression emerges of a subject race, slowly progressing, aspiring towards civilisation
but requiring guidance. Race remained important - railway coaches, for example, were to be
strictly segregated; Africans were not permitted to purchase alcohol save, of course, kaffir
beer." The belief in the ultimate entry of Africans into civilisation did not mean a common
civilisation, but one socially segregated. Labour forms a large component of Sanac's report,
for this is important not only to employers, but also to the discipline of Africans themselves.
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If they are to approach European society, they must have similar experience, including that of
wage labour. Yet it must also be clear that Sanac is not just, or even primarily, about
securing this labour which formed just one part of a vast project which sought to compile the
totality of colonial knowledge on the African. Far from a simple triumph of one system over
another, the resulting strategy blended elements from the Cape and Natal to produce a form
of sovereign government in an age of liberal modes of government.
Two cultures, one country
Sanac sat in a period when, Legassick observed, 'the protagonists in the debate consciously
saw themselves as developing a policy which "transcended" not only what they called the
"assimilative" policies of the nineteenth-century Cape, but what they called the "repressive"
policy of the Republics and perhaps Natal.'100 His observation has lain untouched by
historians who have been content to argue that the policy of Natal triumphed over that of the
Cape, indirect rule over assimilation.
'Transcendence', however, meant the adoption of elements of Cape, Natal, and even Boer,
policies. Liberalism, in the Cape variety, recognised the ultimate humanity of Africans and
their ability to evolve into a common society; it did not, in theory at least, permit cultural or
political autonomy. Indirect rule in Natal denied the possibility of assimilation but granted an
attenuated form of cultural and political responsibility to Africans, while Boer policy was
premised on a denial of equality between the races. These modes of government combined in
Sanac, a strategic initiative to modernise South Africa, which had access to new technologies
of government highlighting the failings of repression as a form of rule. Such lessons could
not be ignored, even in the field of native administration.
There was, of course, space for force, but not as a primary mode of government. Direct rule
was rejected as the cost of the violence of assimilation was too high; indirect rule granted too
much autonomy to Africans, posing a threat to their civilised neighbours. So blossomed a
hybrid, which recognised the limits on government intervention, and the variety of strategies
open to the state. By the close of the Victorian century official thinking had recognised the
legitimacy of African forms of government and, unable to untie the Gordian knot binding law
and society, that of customary law. The parameters within which it operated, and the role it
played, were contested and fluid, yet its basic legitimacy was unquestioned in a mode of
government which prized effectiveness at a minimum cost.
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